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A. The historic tension between federal and state
power over the allocation of water within the
states and the right to regulate water quality and
to achieve the economic benefits from water
through power generation, barge traffic and other
uses is rooted in our federal Constitution. A
logical and very revealing starting point is to
examine the numerous provisions of the Constitu-
tion that vest regulatory power over water in the
Federal Government.
B. See, e.g., U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (Com-
merce Clause);
U.S. Const. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2 (Property Clause);
U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2 (Supremacy Clause);
U.S. Const. art. III, § 1, cl. 2 (Judiciary Arti-
cle);
U.S. Const. art. I, § 10, cl. 3 (Compact Clause);
U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 1 (General Welfare
Clause);
U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. l (Taxing Clause);
U.S. Const. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (Treaty Clause);
U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (Indian Commerce
Clause).
C. On the part of the States, there is only one pro-
vision that purports to reserve power. See U.S.
Const. amend X: "The powers not delegated to the
United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited
by it to the States, are reserved to the States
respectively, or to the people."
D. In my lecture, I will examine what I believe to be
some of the current tensions between federal and
state water regulation--an incredible mismatch of
power that could have devastating impacts on the
future of the smaller states attempting to survive
on scarce nonrenewable water resources. I will
also point out how the Supreme Court might change
its role in interpreting its role vis-a-vis the
States' interest in the precious natural resource
of water.
II.	 NAVIGATION SERVITUDE
A. The Congress and the Supreme Court have been ex-
tremely liberal in interpreting the breadth of the
commerce power as it relates to what it has called
the "federal navigation servitude," prompting some
to conclude that a stream is navigable and there-
fore subject to paramount federal control if it
will float a "supreme court opinion." Others have
concluded that not many would float because the
logic is so full of holes. Nevertheless, this
broad definition of "navigability" has given rise
to extensive regulation and potential conflict
exists between the state and federal interests in
navigability and regulation of water quality and
quantity.
B. See, e.g., United States v. Appalachian Power Co.,
311 U.S. 377 (1940), and cases cited therein,
in particular, United States v. Rio Grande 
Irrigation Co., 174 U.S. 690 (1898);
Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164
(1979);
Federal Water Pollution Control Act of 1972 and
Clean Water Act of 1977, 33 U.S.C.A. CC 125]
- 1376; E.I. DuPont de Nemours and Co. v. 
Train, 430 U.S. 112 (1976).
III.	 HYDROPOWER
A. There is now a growing concern and conflict be-
tween the States and the Federal Government over
the extensive power given the Federal Government
in the Federal Power Act. As federal sources of
revenue for water projects disappear, states look
to their own ability to generate revenue. One of
-3-
those is, of course, the generation and sale of
hydroelectric power. The federal government has
not been known, however, to overlook a cash regis-
ter.
B.	 See, e.g.,
1. The Federal Power Act, 16 U.S.C.A. § 791(a) -
828 (incorporated into the Federal Water
Power Act of 1920, 41 Stat. 1063 (1920)); see
also 91 Stat. 565 (1977) (changing name to
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission); 18
C.F.R. Subch. B, pt. 4 (1982).
4. Public Utilities Regulatory Act of 1978
(PURPA), 16 U.S.C. § 2501 - 2645; American 
Paper Institute, Inc. v. American Electrical 
Power Service Corp., 103 S. Ct. 1921 (1983).
3. Compare California v. United States, 438 U.S.
645 (1978), with FPC v. Union Electric Co.,
381 U.S. 956 (1965), and First Iowa Hydro-
Electric Corp. v. FPC, 328 U.S. 152 (1946).
The latter case gives great breadth to Con-
gress in this area and narrowly construes
state power under 16 U.S.C. §§ 821 and 802.
4. See also Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee, 104 S. Ct.
615 (1984); Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. 
State Energy Resources Conservation & Devel-
gpment Commission, 75 L. Ed. 2d 752 (1983).
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IV. FEDERAL RESERVED RIGHTS FOR INDIAN TRIBES
A. The rights of Indian tribes in the waters underly-
ing or running through their reservations are
likewise protected by the obligation to respect
treaties, laws of antecedent sovereigns, and acts
of Congress or a combination of all of these.
Because these rights are outside the traditional
sources of power under state law, uncertainty ex-
ists as to the value of water rights under state
law, and expensive and seemingly never-ending ad-
judications of water rights are taking place
throughout the West.
B. See, e.g., Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564
(1908);
Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546 (1963);
Arizona v. California, 103 S. Ct. 1382 (1983);
Arizona v. San Carlos Apache Tribe of Arizona, 103
S. Ct. 3201 (1983);
Nevada v. United States, 103 S. Ct. 2906 (1983).
V. RESERVED RIGHTS FOR FEDERAL LANDS
A. Although the Desert Lands Act of 1877 gave great
latitude to the States in regulating their water
resources and the extent of federal reserved water
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rights has been narrowly construed, still the po-
tential for exertion of federal power over ground-
water is plainly evident and, indeed, water could
be a source of federal revenue either through
sales or leases.
B.	 See, e.g., Desert Lands Act of 1877;
California-Oregon Power Co. v. Beaver Portland
Cement Co., 285 U.S. 142 (1935);
United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. 696 (1978);
Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529 (1976).
VI. FEDERAL POWER TO APPROVE INTERSTATE COMPACTS
A. The approval of interstate compacts likewise has
provided an extensive source of power preempting
state law. An unanswered question is the rela-
tionship between compacts and the commerce clause:
Does mere congressional approval of an apportion-
ment under a compact entitle states to limit the
use of water to users within the state if the
states have allowed the development of an intra-
state water market? Also unanswered is the issue
of the extent to which these compacts include hy-
drologically related groundwater.
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B. See, e.g., Frankfurter & Landis, The Compact
Clause of the Constitution, 34 Yale L.J. 685
(1925); Zimmerman & Wendell, The Interstate 
Compact since 1925 (Council of State Govern-
ments, 1925);
See also Intake Water Co. v. Yellowstone Compact 
Commission, 590 F. Supp. 293 (D. Mont. 1984);
Texas v. New Mexico, 103 S. Ct. 2558 (1983).
VII. THE SUPREME COURT'S EQUITABLE APPORTIONMENT POWER
A. The power of the Supreme Court to adjudicate the
rights between states to interstate streams unap-
portioned by compacts or by the Congress is yet
another example of a water policy being developed
at the federal level. The degree to which these
kinds of decisions will be extended to aquifers
lying under more than one state and the degree to
which they seem to promote the concept of water as
a regionally controlled rather than a state-
controlled resource likewise raises important is-
sues for states seeking to control their water
supplies.
B. See, e.g., Colorado v. New Mexico, 104 S. Ct. 2433
(1983);
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Idaho ex rel. Evans v. Oregon, 103 S. Ct. 2817
(1983).
VIII. THE SUPREME COURT AS PROMOTER OF A NATIONAL MARKET FOR
WATER AND PROTECTOR AGAINST EXCESSES OF STATE SOVER-
EIGNTY
A. The Supreme Court in its interpretation of its
role as promoting the free flow of goods in inter-
state commerce, even where Congress has not acted,
has had tremendous impact on the role of states in
controlling their water supply. The Court has
held that a state's ownership of water within its
boundaries is a legal fiction and that states are
in effect powerless to maintain some quantity of
water within their borders for the future because
water, according to the Court, is nothing more
than a commodity.
B. See, e.g., Sporhase v. Nebraska, 458 U.S. 941
(1982);
El Paso v. Reynolds, 597 F. Supp. 694 (D.N.M.
1984).
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IX. THE MARKET PARTICIPATION DOCTRINE--A SLIGHT CRACK IN
THE FEDERAL ARMOR
A. Bending to the concept that the States should not
be foreclosed from competing in the marketplace
for commodities, and possibly for resources, the
Supreme Court has held that states can exercise
control in the fact of commerce clause challenges
if the state is not regulating a commodity, such
as water, but, rather, is acting as a market par-
ticipant in the interstate market.
B. See, e.g., Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426
U.S. 794 (1976);
Reeves v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429 (1980);
South Central Timber Development, Inc. v. Wun-
nicke, 104 S. Ct. 2237 (1984).
X. TRADITIONAL CONCEPTS OF SOVEREIGNTY MAY ULTIMATELY AS-
SIST STATES IN CONTROLLING THEIR WATER SUPPLY
A. Justice Stone many years ago in his famous foot-
note in the Caroline Products Co. case may have
explained the need for the States to maintain con-
trol over their water resources and have more ac-
curately described an appropriate role for the
Supreme Court. The Court may need to emerge as
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protector of the smaller, politically less power-
ful states in the face of growing congressional
power. Stated simply, an adequate water supply is
an essential prerequisite to state survival and
state survival is mandated by the tenth amendment
to the United States Constitution. Unlike a major
corporation that leaves an area when nonrenewable
water resources are gone, states cannot constitu-
tionally go out of business.
B.	 See, e..g.t , United States v. Caroline Products Co.,
304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.5 (1958);
DuMars, Evaluating Congressional Limits on a 
State's Severance Tax Equity Interest in Its 
Natural Resources: An Essential Responsibil-
ity for the Supreme Court, 22 Nat. Resources
J. 673 (1982);
New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311
(1932).
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